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Thomas Schelling developed an influential demographic model
that illustrated how, even with relatively mild assumptions
on each individual’s nearest neighbor preferences, an inte-
grated city would likely unravel to a segregated city, even if
all individuals prefer integration. Individuals in Schelling’s
model cities are divided into two groups of equal number
and each individual is ’happy’ or ’unhappy’ when the num-
ber of similar neighbors cross a simple threshold. In this
manuscript we consider natural extensions of Schelling’s
original model to allow the two groups have different sizes
and to allow different notions of happiness of an individual.
We observe that differences in aggregation patterns of ma-
jority and minority groups are highly sensitive to the happi-
ness threshold; for low threshold, the differences are small,
and when the threshold is raised, striking new patterns
emerge. We also observe that when individuals strongly
prefer to live integrated neighborhoods, the final states ex-
hibit a new tessellated-like structure.
1 Introduction
In the 1970s, the eminent economic modeler Thomas Schelling proposed a sim-
ple space-time population model to illustrate how, even with relatively mild
assumptions concerning every individual’s nearest neighbor preferences, an in-
tegrated city would likely unravel to a segregated city, even if all individuals
prefer integration [14, 16, 15, 17]. Individuals in Schelling’s cities are divided
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into two groups of equal number and each individual is ’happy’ or ’unhappy’
when the number of similar neighbors cross a simple threshold. This agent based
lattice model has become quite influential amongst social scientists, demogra-
phers, and economists, and some authors have used the Schelling-like models to
analyze actual populations in cities [4, 2, 1, 13, 5]. Currently, there is a spirited
discussion amongst demographers on the validity of Schelling-type models to
describe actual segregation, with arguments both for (e.g., [21, 6]), and against
(e.g., [8, 7]).
Aggregation relates to individuals from the same group joining together to
form clusters. Schelling equated global aggregation with segregation. Many
authors assumed that the striking global aggregation observed in simulations
on very small ideal “cities” persists for large, realistic size cities. In [19] we
showed that this is false. There have been simulations of segregation models
for large cities, in part due to the large computational costs required to run
simulations using existing algorithms [11, 6, 6, 22, 20]. We developed highly
efficient and fast algorithms that allow us to run many simulations for many
sets of parameters and to compute meaningful statistics of the measures of
aggregation.
We modify two central assumptions of Schelling’s original model. Schelling
assumed that the number of agents in both groups is the same and we allow
different numbers (a majority and a minority). Schelling also defined an agent
as being either ’happy’ or ’unhappy’ based on a threshold number of agents from
the same group in its neighborhood, and we consider two new happiness criteria:
1) the happiness of an agent is a linearly increasing function of the number of
similar agents in its neighborhood, and 2) an agent is maximally happy in a
completely integrated neighborhood and its happiness declines linearly when
the neighborhood is dominated by either type of agents (see Figure 7).
We show that the happiness threshold plays an important role in cities where
one group forms a majority. When an agent needs three similar agents in its
neighborhood to be happy, there is little difference in the aggregation patterns of
majority and minority agents. When the threshold rises to four, distinct geomet-
ric differences emerge. When agents prefer to live in integrated neighborhoods,
the two types of agents arrange themselves in a tessellated-like structure across
the city.
1.1 Description of the Model
We follow [19] and view Schelling’s model 1 as a three parameter family of mod-
els. The phase space for these models is the N ×N square lattice with periodic
boundary conditions (opposite sides identified). We consider two distinct pop-
ulations composed of black agents (squares) B and red agents (squares) R (red
squares appear grey on b/w printing) and we do not assume that #B = #R.
Together these agents fill up most of the N2 sites, with V remaining vacant
1Different authors frequently consider slightly different versions of Schelling’s original
model, i.e.,different ways of moving boundary agents. All versions seem to exhibit the same
qualitative behaviors, and thus we refer to the Schelling model.
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sites (white squares). Each agent has eight nearest neighbors, corresponding to
a Moore, or Queen, neighborhood. Different types of neighborhoods were con-
sidered by different authors (see, e.g, [6, 5], where the size of the neighborhood
was referred to as ‘vision’). Demographically, the parameter N controls the size
of the city and v = V/N2 controls the population density or the occupancy ratio
[3]. We introduce a utility function, Ui,j that measures the happiness of the
agent at lattice square (i, j) as a function of the states of its eight nearest neigh-
bors. The function U can have two (i.e., 0 and 1 – ”unhappy” and ”happy”)
or more values. The convention is that larger values of U for a given agent
correspond to increased happiness.
We follow Schelling and begin the evolution by choosing an initial configu-
ration starting with a checkerboard with periodic boundary conditions. Then,
if necessary, we substitute B agents by R agents to achieve the desired ratio
#R/#B. Demographically, a checkerboard configuration is a maximally inte-
grated configuration. We then randomly remove #V agents to create vacant
locations (keeping the ratio #R/#B constant). Finally we permute agents in
two 3 × 3 blocks. Alternatively, we could choose a random initial configura-
tion. In general, except for small values of v, the final states with a random
initial configuration are quantitatively similar to the ones obtained using the
Schelling-like initial conditions.
We randomly select a B agent and a vacant site, such that when moved to
the vacant site the B agent becomes “happier”. If the utility function U only
attains the values 0 and 1, corresponding to ”unhappy” and ”happy” as in the
original Schelling protocol ([14, 12, 1, 19]), the B agent must be unhappy at the
original location and happy at the new location. Provided this is possible, we
interchange the B agent with the vacant site, so that the utility function of the
B agent increases. Then we randomly select an R agent and a vacant site, where
that R agent would be happier by switching with the vacant site. Provided this
is possible, we interchange the R with the vacant site. We repeat this iterative
procedure, alternating between selecting a B agent and an R agent, until a final
state is reached, where no interchange is possible that increases happiness. For
some final states, some (and in some cases, many) agents may be unhappy, but
there are no allowable switches.
We simulate the model and quantify the aggregation. We currently need
approximately one minute to run a single simulation for a city of size N = 100
and we ran thousands of simulations for this manuscript. The details of the
algorithm were presented in [19]. We study the dynamics for large lattices and
present our results for city size N = 100. As in [19], choosing N greater than 100
does not lead to qualitatively or quantitatively different states and phenomena.
2 Minorities
We first consider an extension of the original Schelling model to allow for ”mi-
nority” and majority populations – configurations where the number of R agents
is larger that the number of B agents, or visa versa. The “agent comfortabil-
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ity index”, T ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 8}, quantifies an agent’s tolerance to living amongst
disparate nearest neighbors. For a given value of T , a B or R agent is happy
if T or more of its nearest eight neighbors are B’s or R’s, respectively. Else it
is unhappy. We follow Schelling’s evolution algorithm [14], later used in [12, 1],
and begin by choosing an initial configuration by the method described above.
We then randomly select an unhappy B and a vacant site surrounded by at least
T nearest B neighbors. Provided this is possible, we interchange the unhappy
B with the vacant site, so that this B becomes happy. We then randomly select
an unhappy R and a vacant site having at least T nearest neighbors of type
R. Provided this is possible, we interchange the unhappy R and the vacant
site, so that R becomes happy. We repeat this procedure, alternating between
selecting an unhappy B and an unhappy R, until a final state is reached, where
no interchange is possible that increases happiness. For some final states, some
(and in some cases, many) agents may be unhappy, but there are no allowable
switches.
To quantify the disparity between the number of agents, we introduce the
parameter
r =
#R
#R + #B
.
Without loss of generality we assume that #R ≥ #B, so that, 0.5 ≤ r ≤ 1. The
case r = 0.5 corresponds to the equal numbers of agents and r = 1 corresponds
to all red agents. Numerical simulations indicate that meaningful results only
occur for r values between 0.5 and 0.7. For larger r values the minority agents
are too far apart and can not provide sufficient nuclei for aggregation.
We consider neighbor comfort thresholds T = 3, 4 and vacancy ratio v be-
tween 2% and 33%. The system does not evolve very much for other values of
T : for T = 1, 2 almost all of the agents are satisfied in most of the initial con-
figurations, while for T ≥ 5 there are almost no legal switches for the minority
agents. Values of v larger than 33% correspond to unrealistic environments. For
each pair of parameters T and v, we perform 100 simulations and we determine
mean values of aggregation measures based on these 100 simulations. As our
sample size (100) is large, the Central Limit Theorem provides 95% confidence
intervals for our estimates of aggregation measures.
Similarly to our construction in the r = 1/2 case, we introduce the adjusted
perimeter per agent p of the interface between the different agents suitably ad-
justed for the vacant spaces. The perimeter P is defined as twice the total
number of R-B connections plus the total number of connections between R
and B agents with vacant spaces. Demographically, the adjusted perimeter,
p = P/N2, is the average number of contacts an agent has with the opposite
kind or with vacant sites. In the segregation literature, the perimeter is related
to the exposure index (see, e.g., [9]).
Our key observation is that p is a Lyapunov function, i.e., a function defined
on every configuration that is strictly decreasing along the evolution of the
system. Thus the system evolves to minimize the adjusted interface between
the R and B agents. The final states are precisely the local minimizers of the
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Lyapunov function, subject to the threshold constraint. This Lyapunov function
is also the Hamiltonian for a related spin lattice system related to the Ising model
[18]. Such a definition of p was motivated by analogies of these models with the
physics of foams. Note, that for the triangular utility function, like the ones
considered in [22] and Sect. 3.2 below, p is not a Lyapunov function.
In Figs. 1-6, we present characteristic final states for different values of T ,
r, and v. For the sake of comparison we include the corresponding figures for
r = 0.5 from [19].
2.1 T = 3
Figs. 1-3 show characteristic final states for different values of T = 3.
For small values of v large blocks of the initial checkerboard configuration
remain unchanged during the evolution. In [19] we called this phenomenon
super-stability of the checkerboard. Every agent in a checkerboard is not just
happy, it has four like neighbors; therefore has one like neighbor to spare. Thus
it takes a large deviation from the checkerboard pattern to make an agent move
and only agents close to the initially perturbed sites move. For the Minority
agents the super-stability is less pronounced: as the Minority agents occupy way
less than half of the squares, some of them in an original configuration have 3,
or even 2, like neighbors. Therefore, the Minority agents are more sensitive to
the perturbations of initial structure. This results in the appearance of small
dense clusters of minority agents. The number of such clusters is smaller for
r = 0.7 than for r = 0.6 because in the former case there are less B agents.
Otherwise the minority states do not differ much from the r = 0.5 states.
2.2 T = 4
Figs. 4-6 show characteristic final states for different values of T = 4.
Unlike the case r = 0.5, for larger values of r there are unhappy minority
agents in the final configurations. For r = 0.6 the unhappy agents are present
for v = 2% only. For r = 0.7 they are present all the way up to v = 33%, but
their number steadily decreases as v increases.
The major difference between the T = 4 and T = 3 cases is that for T = 4,
just by looking at the final state one can readily say which type of agents are
in minority. For small values of v, the majority agents appear to be uniformly
distributed over the city, while the minority agents are concentrated in a rela-
tively few dense clusters. This phenomenon can be explained by the fact that
in the initial configuration, even for small values of v, many minority agents are
unhappy.
Similarly to the T = 3 case, the distribution of the majority, R, agents
remains almost the same as in the equal number case. They form dense clusters
(almost no vacancies inside clusters) and the clusters are ”snakelike”: long and
wavy, with a relatively large boundary to area ratio. The B agents form smaller
clusters, that are more ”circular”. These clusters also also uniformly distributed
over the city.
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Figure 1: Characteristic final states for neighbor comfort threshold T = 3 and
r = 0.5 for different vacancy ratio v: A: v = 2%, B: v = 6%, C: v = 10%, D:
v = 15%, E: v = 20%, F: v = 24%, G: v = 28%, H: v = 33%.
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Figure 1: Characteristic final states for neighbor comfort threshold T = 3 and
r = 0.5 for different vacancy ratio v: A: v = 2%, B: v = 6%, C: v = 10%, D:
v = 15%, E: v = 20%, F: v = 24%, G: v = 28%, H: v = 33%.
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Figure 2: Characteristic final states for neighbor comfort threshold T = 3 and
r = 0.6 for different vacancy ratio v: A: v = 2%, B: v = 6%, C: v = 10%, D:
v = 15%, E: v = 20%, F: v = 24%, G: v = 28%, H: v = 33%.
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Figure 2: Characteristic final states for neighbor comfort threshold T = 3 and
r = 0.6 for different vacancy ratio v: A: v = 2%, B: v = 6%, C: v = 10%, D:
v = 15%, E: v = 20%, F: v = 24%, G: v = 28%, H: v = 33%.
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Figure 3: Characteristic final states for neighbor comfort threshold T = 3 and
r = 0.7 for different vacancy ratio v: A: v = 2%, B: v = 6%, C: v = 10%, D:
v = 15%, E: v = 20%, F: v = 24%, G: v = 28%, H: v = 33%.
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Figure 3: Characteristic final states for neighbor comfort threshold T = 3 and
r = 0.7 for different vacancy ratio v: A: v = 2%, B: v = 6%, C: v = 10%, D:
v = 15%, E: v = 20%, F: v = 24%, G: v = 28%, H: v = 33%.
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Figure 4: Characteristic final states for neighbor comfort threshold T = 4 and
r = 0.5 for different vacancy ratio v: A: v = 2%, B: v = 6%, C: v = 10%, D:
v = 15%, E: v = 20%, F: v = 24%, G: v = 28%, H: v = 33%.
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Figure 4: Characteristic final states for neighbor comfort threshold T = 4 and
r = 0.5 for different vacancy ratio v: A: v = 2%, B: v = 6%, C: v = 10%, D:
v = 15%, E: v = 20%, F: v = 24%, G: v = 28%, H: v = 33%.
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Figure 5: Characteristic final states for neighbor comfort threshold T = 4 and
r = 0.6 for different vacancy ratio v: A: v = 2%, B: v = 6%, C: v = 10%, D:
v = 15%, E: v = 20%, F: v = 24%, G: v = 28%, H: v = 33%.
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Figure 5: Characteristic final states for neighbor comfort threshold T = 4 and
r = 0.6 for different vacancy ratio v: A: v = 2%, B: v = 6%, C: v = 10%, D:
v = 15%, E: v = 20%, F: v = 24%, G: v = 28%, H: v = 33%.
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Figure 6: Characteristic final states for neighbor comfort threshold T = 4 and
r = 0.7 for different vacancy ratio v: A: v = 2%, B: v = 6%, C: v = 10%, D:
v = 15%, E: v = 20%, F: v = 24%, G: v = 28%, H: v = 33%.
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Figure 6: Characteristic final states for neighbor comfort threshold T = 4 and
r = 0.7 for different vacancy ratio v: A: v = 2%, B: v = 6%, C: v = 10%, D:
v = 15%, E: v = 20%, F: v = 24%, G: v = 28%, H: v = 33%.
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3 Alternative Utility Functions
In our previous manuscript [19] we studied the final states in the Schelling Model
with fixed threshold T . Here we study dynamics using linear and triangular
utility functions. Thus the happiness of an agent is no longer a binary function.
For the former, agents move as long as their happiness increases.
The linear utility function
UM = #(like neighbors),
corresponds to the desire of agents to be surrounded by as many similar agents
as possible. The triangle utility function is in a sense opposite –
UT = 4− |4−#(like neighbors)| ,
where the happiness increases linearly until an agent has four similar neighbors
and then the happiness declines linearly to 0. This is a particular case of mixed-
neighborhood preferences (see, e.g., [10]. Thus an agent is maximally happy
when it is surrounded by four similar neighbors. Such agents prefer to live
in maximally mixed neighborhoods. The plots of the two utility functions are
presented in Fig. 7.
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Figure 7: Militancy (left panel) and Triangle (right panel) Utility functions.
We quantify the aggregation in final states using the four quantitative mea-
sures that we used in [19]:
(1) The [u/l]-measure is the ratio of unlike to like neighbors. For a lattice site
with coordinates (i, j) we define:
[u/l]i,j =
qi,j + wi,j
si,j
,
where si,j , qi,j , and wi,j are the number of like, unlike, and vacant neighbors
of the agent located at (i, j), respectively. We define the sparsity 〈[u/l]〉 of a
cluster by averaging the [u/l]-measure over the given cluster.
(2) The number of agents that have neighbors only of the same kind (note,
that this definition excludes the vacant spaces). The abundance of such agents
indicates the presence of large, “solid” clusters. This quantity is the most useful
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in distinguishing between the states with T = 3 and T = 4. We call the latter
quantity the seclusiveness.
(3) The adjusted perimeter per agent p of the interface between the different
agents suitably adjusted for the vacant spaces. The perimeter P is defined as
twice the total number of R-B connections plus the total number of connections
between R and B agents with vacant spaces, and p = P/N2 (see also discussion
in Sect. 2).
(4) The total number of clusters in a configuration NC . This intuitively ap-
pealing measure of aggregation is useful to describe final states having mostly
large compact clusters. For such systems, NC is the quantity that attracts the
viewer’s attention first. But to immediately see its limitation, observe that “the
maximally integrated” checkerboard configuration with v = 0 has just 1+1 = 2
clusters. This is because two squares are considered to belong to the same clus-
ter if they touch by a side or a vertex, and clusters may be intermingled. The
quantity NC is the most useful for configurations consisting of compact clusters
of a similar size.
For each set of parameters’ values we run 100 simulations and Fig. 8 shows
plots of average values of these measures of aggregation.
3.1 Militancy model
In some settings individuals may wish to be surrounded by as many neighboring
individuals of the same type as possible. Sociologically this could correspond to
hostile environments, when the relations between the two types of groups are
badly strained – which is why we called such models militancy models. Fig. 9.
shows characteristic final states for the militancy model.
The weighted total perimeter is a Lyapunov function (see [19] and Sect. 2
for details). However, there is also a simpler Lyapunov function, the sum of the
utility functions of all the agents:
L = −
∑
Ui,j .
Indeed, if a given agent has si,j like neighbors, the total input in L due to
his presence is −2si,j (−si,j comes from his personal utility function and −1
is contributed by each of his si,j like neighbors). As every move increases the
utility function, L monotonically decreases at every step.
The existence of a Lyapunov function guarantees that the model converges
to a final steady state. Moreover, since L decreases by at least one on every
switch and L cannot be less than −16N2, there can only be finitely many moves
before the algorithm converges to an equilibrium state.
We observe from Fig. 9 that for all values of v, except for v = 2%, the
final configuration is far from the global minimum of the Lyapunov function
L, which is realized when the agents of each kind occupy two completely filled
“strips” with vacant spots forming a strip between them. The corresponding
minimum value of Lmim ≈ −16(1−v)N2+12N . However the Lyapunov function
13
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Figure 8: Statistics of final states for Schelling model with regular, militancy
and triangle utility functions (a) Perimeter; (b) Number of clusters; (c) Number
of agents with 8 similar neighbors; (d) Unlike/Like Ratio.
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Figure 9: Typical final states for militancy model
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Figure 9: Typical final states for militancy model
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L landscape is filled with local minima and simulations stop when the system
reaches any of the local minima. The landscapes for the two Lyapunov functions
L and P are not identical. For L, every valid switch which decreases L is valid
step for the system and vice versa. This is not true for P , where although every
valid switch decreases P , not every move which decreases P is not a valid move.
Thus, the reduction of L is the objective of evolution whereas the reduction of
P is only an indicator of evolution.
In most simulations, especially for relatively large values of v, like agents in
final states are contained in one or two large connected clusters that are dense
and ”snaky” along with at most a few almost circular clusters. The vacant
spaces are also ”dense” and, frequently serve as buffer zones between the R and
B clusters. By providing opportunities for increasingly “easier satisfaction,” one
might believe that decreasing v increases the number of centers of aggregation.
In other words, when there are a lot of vacancies, agents have many choices and
it leads to appearance of many small “islands”. Later in evolution, some of the
islands may, and do, merge, creating the observed wavy structure. We believe
that by allowing a pair of agents, rather than a single agent, to move, the final
states may have lower value of L.
The statistics of the characteristics of final states for the militancy model
resemble those for T = 4, see Fig. 8. The difference between them is more
quantitative than qualitative. For states with many vacancies, the similarities
are the most pronounced, while for small v, the final states for the militancy
model have much smaller perimeter.
3.2 Triangle utility function
Figure 10 illustrates some typical limit states for the triangle utility function.
The clusters in the final states are for most part, intermeshed, but distinct
clusters are seen for v = 0.28 and v = 0.33. These clusters are not compact and
are extremely sparse for v = 0.28 and v = 0.33. Therefore the ratio of unlike
to like neighbors remains very close to 1 throughout. Thus the triangle utility
allows final states to be less isolated than ones for the threshold models.
Unlike any other case, the final states for the triangular utility function
contain clusters possessing a ”tessellated-like” structure. The final states are
composed of subsets where the original checkerboard configuration survived,
islands that contain agents of one type, and vacancies – all having a type of
’tessellated’ structure. As the number of vacancies grow, the ’tessellated’ area
also grows, reaching the total area around v = 0.28. As the value of v increases,
the islands tend to aggregate into one major cluster of each type. For every
value of v, the number of clusters is lower than for the regular Schelling Model,
which suggests a greater degree of segregation.
The final state statistics resemble those for T = 3, see Fig. 8. This is quite
natural, since in both cases most agents in the final states have 3 to 5 like
neighbors.
16
Figure 10: Typical final states for the Schelling Model with triangle utility
function for different values of v
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Figure 10: Typical final states for the Schelling Model with triangle utility
function for different values of v.
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